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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
ANTITRUST-VENUE-Time of Venue Under Section 12 
of the Clayton Act Refers to Time When Action 
Accrued-Eastland Construction Co. v. 
Keasbey & Mattison Co.* 
In 1964, plaintiff brought a treble damage suit under the Clay-
ton Act in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California, alleging that defendant had violated the antitrust laws 
while doing business in that district.1 Defendant, a Pennsylvania 
corporation which formerly had conducted a portion of its business 
in California but which had ceased all activities there in 1962, 
moved for dismissal, arguing that venue was improper because it 
was not transacting business in the Northern District of California 
at the time suit was instituted. On appeal from a ruling by the dis-
trict court granting the motion for dismissal, held, reversed. The 
proper temporal reference for venue under the Clayton Act is the 
time when the cause of action accrued and therefore venue was 
proper because defendant had been transacting business in Cali-
fornia when the alleged antitrust violations occurred. 
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, under the heading "District in 
which to sue corporation," provides: "Any suit, action, or proceed-
ing under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought 
not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but 
also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts busi-
ness .... "2 There has been some question as to the proper applica-
tion of this venue provision when a corporation has ceased doing 
business in a district before it has become a defendant in a private 
antitrust action.3 The case authority is almost equally divided: some 
decisions reflect the "narrow view" that a corporation must be 
"found" or "transacting business" in a district on the day the com-
plaint is filed for venue to be proper in that district, 4 while others 
• 358 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
I. Keasbey &: Mattison and its co-defendant, Johns-Manville Corporation, were 
charged with violations of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act in the production and sale 
of asbestos-cement pipe and couplings. • 
2. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). 
3. Cases involving corporations which have been dissolved are not treated here. 
Most states have statutes prolonging the capacity of a dissolved corporation to sue 
or be sued. See 19 AM. JUR. 2o Corporations §§ 1669, 1672, 1673 (1965); Annots., 47 
A.L.R. 1288 (1927), 97 A.L.R. 477 (1935). 
4. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 230 F.2d 511 (3d 
Cir. 1956); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1965); 
School Dist. v. Kurtz Bros., 240 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Gem Corrugated Box 
Corp. v. Mead Corp., 189 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Schreiber v. Loew's Inc., 147 
F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1957); 2 TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAws § 24.5 (1949); Note, 37 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 268 (1962). 
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adopt the "broad view" and hold that a corporation "found" or 
"transacting business" in the forum district at the time of the alleged 
antitrust violation, although not at the commencement of the ac-
tion, is nevertheless amenable to suit there. is 
Although the court in the principal case adopted the broad view, 
some support can be found for the proposition that the venue re-
quirements must be fulfilled as to a corporate defendant at the 
time an action is begun. Arguably, the fact that section 12 of the 
Clayton Act is phrased in the present tense6 gives rise to the infer-
ence that Congress intended venue to be determined by the loca-
tion of the parties at the beginning of suit. Furthermore, since 
venue is only a "forum-selecting" device, it may be argued that it 
should be easily determinable.7 However, to force a court first to 
decide when a cause of action accrued and then whether a defen-
dant corporation satisfied the venue requirements at that time-as 
is required under the broad view-would, in effect, necessitate a 
separate trial on these venue questions alone. Thus the narrow in-
terpretation has the advantage of specifying an exact day-the day 
the complaint is filed-on which the venue requirement must be 
satisfied. Moreover, support for the narrow view is found in the 
contention that venue requirements are, and should be, based upon 
the convenience of both parties at the time of suit. 8 If this is, in 
fact, the guiding principle underlying the venue requirements, 
venue should be governed by the parties' positions at the commence-
ment of the action. Finally, proponents of the narrow view point 
to the legislative history of section 12's venue provision. They argue 
that the requirements have not been changed since they were es-
tablished in 1914 and that at that time Congress intended that a 
private party should go to a foreign jurisdiction in order to sue a 
corporation which had injured him if that corporation was no 
longer transacting business where the injury occurred.9 
However, upon closer analysis, the congressional intent in-
ferred from the legislative history of section 12 seemingly supports 
the broad view rather than the narrow.10 It is evident from the 
Congressional Record that Congress' concern was not for the con-
5. Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Tex. 1964); R. J. 
Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 
1960); Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. 
Va. 1954). 
6. A suit "may be brought" where a corporation "may be found" or "transacts 
business." 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). (Emphasis added.) 
7. City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
8. 1 .BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACI1CE &: PROCEDURE § 80 (Wright ed. Supp. 
1965). 
9. See cases thus interpreting the legislative history cited note 4 supra. 
10. The relevant passages in the Congressional Record include: 51 CoNG. REc. 
9190, 9414-17, 9466-67, 9607-08, 9663, 9682, 16274, 16342 (1914). 
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venience of both antitrust plaintiffs and defendants. Rather, the 
purpose of section 12 was to facilitate the maintenance of antitrust 
suits by injured parties; the possible burdens on corporate defen-
dants was not deemed to be a consideration of equal importance.11 
The debates surrounding the passage of section 12 indicate that 
Congress intended to aid private parties by allowing them to main-
tain suits in the district in which they were injured by a corpora-
tion's antitrust violations.12 Such favoritism was prompted by the 
idea that government enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts should be supplemented by an army of private policemen, 
which army would constitute an additional deterrent to antitrust 
violations.13 Although the Supreme Court has never passed on the 
precise issue facing the court in the principal case, it has indicated 
that its interpretation of congressional intent is coincident with 
that underlying the broad view,14 for it has concluded that section 12 
11. This attitude is also reflected in the recent cases interpreting § 5(b) of the 
Clayton Act, llS Stat. 7lll, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). In Michigan v. Morton 
Salt Co., BNA ANTITRUST &: TRADE REG. REP. No. 265 (D. Minn. July 28, 1966), the 
court, finding a strong policy favoring treble damage plaintiffs, held that the Clayton 
Act's statute of limitations tolled during government prosecutions both as to persons 
who were defendants in the government action and as to non-defendants. The latter 
class of persons had previously been held exempt from the tolling provisions, but 
the court in Morton Salt felt that, to insure an effective remedy, private plaintiffs 
must be given the benefit of government litigation to establish their prima facie 
case even against persons not participating in the earlier action. 
12. Representative Cullop stated: "I want him to sue at home in the jurisdic• 
tion where the cause of action arose." 51 CONG. REc. 9416 (1914). "We are liberalizing 
the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual who is damaged the right 
to get his damages anywhere-anywhere you can catch the offender." 51 CONG. REc. 
16274 (1914) (remarks of Representative Webb). Representative Dickinson, in support 
of his suggested addition of a "doing business" phrase, expressed a desire to conect 
the situation where "those who have suffered damages at the hands of a corporation 
shall be compelled to bring suit in the remote State or district of which the corporation 
js an inhabitant by virtue of its incorporation therein •.• while it goes forth in re-
mote sections of the country, and where its greed for unlawful gain willfully disre-
gards the rights of others." 51 CONG. REc. 9190 (1914). 
Ill. Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., ll5 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D. 
N.J. 1940): "Section 7, the three-fold damage clause ••• was designed to supply an 
ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the Department of Justice in 
law enforcement." 
14. The Supreme Court has discussed the Congressional purpose for enacting the 
special venue clause of the Clayton Act in three noteworthy opinions. In Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 27ll U.S. ll59, ll7ll-74 (1927), the Court 
stated: 
fTlhis section [12] supplements the remedial provision of the Anti-Trust Act ••• 
by· relieving the injured person from the necessity of resorting for the redress 
of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, 
in which it resides or may be "found"-often an insuperable obstacle-and en-
abling him to institute the suit in a district, frequently that of his own residence 
in which the corporation in fact transacts business. • 
Dictum in the 1948 case of United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 3ll3 U.S. 
795 (1948), is often cited as authority for the liberal interpretation of venue. The Court 
said in that case: "A foreign corporation no longer could come to a district, perpetrate 
there the injuries outlawed, and then by retreating or even without retreating to its 
headquarters defeat or delay the retribution due." Id. at 808. Both of these cases are 
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was intended to make more forums available to an injured plaintiff 
than were available before the enactment of that section.15 
The court in the principal case (the first court of appeals in ten 
years16 to rule on the temporal reference problem) felt constrained 
to adopt the broad view in light of the policy considerations under-
lying the Clayton Act. The court reasoned that the procedural im-
pact of a ruling that venue was improper as to a corporate defen-
dant which allegedly had committed antitrust violations in the 
forum district and which had departed before the institution of a 
suit against it there ran counter to the intent of Congress.17 Where 
a private party plaintiff is attempting to bring an action against a 
single corporate defendant which has left the district, a denial of 
proper venue in the plaintiff's home district might deter him from 
further prosecuting the suit. Surely factors such as the distance he 
must go in order to find a district in which the defendant is trans-
acting business, the amount of money and time needed to maintain 
a distant action, and the anticipated difficulties in the production 
of evidence at distant forums would weigh heavily against his initial 
decision to prosecute. Furthermore, in those treble damage actions 
based upon antitrust violations which are conspiratorial in nature, 
it will frequently be necessary, or at least advantageous, for an in-
jured party to bring a single action against all the alleged offenders. 
However, pursuant to the narrow interpretation of section 12, if 
some of the co-conspirators have left the district in which the 
injury occurred, venue in that district would be deemed to be im-
proper as to them. The plaintiff would then be forced to maintain 
cited in United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948), where the 
Court again expressed its view concerning the purpose of the Act: 
Congress' concern was . • • to provide broader and more effective relief, both 
substantively and procedurally, for persons injured by violations of its antitrust 
policy. Insofar as convenience in bringing suit and conducting trial was involved, 
the purpose was to make these laws less incon.venient for plaintiffs or, as was said 
in the Eastman opinion, to remove the "often insuperable obstacle" thrown in their 
way by the existing venue restrictions. 
Id. at 581. 
15. For discussions of Supreme Court interpretation of the Clayton Act in cases 
taking the broad view, see Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323, 327 
(N.D. Tex. 1964); R. J. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial Ins. Co., 192 F. 
Supp. 522, 523 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, 
Inc., 140 F. Supp. 401, 402 (E.D. Va. 1954). 
16. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 230 F.2d 511 (!Id Cir. 
1956), adopted the narrow approach, requiring that the defendant be transacting 
business in the forum district at the time of suit in order to establish proper venue 
under the Clayton Act. That case, however, involved a corporation which had filed a 
certificate of withdrawal from the state of Pennsylvania, by which it waived venue 
objections to suits concerning its outstanding obligations. The court held that venue 
was proper because of this waiver and did not reach the question facing the court in 
the principal case. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the principal case, states 
only that it does not consider the Sunbury case controlling. Principal case at 779. 
17. Principal case at 780-81. 
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several actions in order to sue all of the co-conspirators unless, at 
the time of suit, there existed a fortuitous situation in which all 
were "found" or "transacting business" in the same district. Con-
sequently, the deterrent effect upon a plaintiff's action that was 
mentioned above in connection with cases involving only a single 
offender is multiplied. Moreover, because of the expense generally 
involved in antitrust litigation, it is unrealistic to expect a private 
party to bring more than one action. Therefore, if the army of pri-
vate enforcers is to be effective, the holding in the principal case, 
which allows a single suit to be brought against all the departed 
co-conspirators in the district where the violation occurred, is re-
quired.18 
While both congressional intent and practical considerations 
thus support the adoption of the broad view, several problems re-
main concerning the scope of the holding in the principal case. 
First, there is the question whether a corporation which left a dis-
trict for valid business reasons, as well as one which fled expressly 
to avoid suit, is amenable to suit in that district. As a general rule, 
a corporation's motives for departing have received little if any 
consideration when a motion to dismiss because of improper venue 
has been made,19 and it would be prudent to continue this ap-
proach. To consider motivation would only becloud the venue ques-
tion and necessitate an extended inquiry totally unrelated to the 
merits of the plaintiff's claim. In order to give effect to the con-
gressional intent to aid treble-damage plaintiffs and also to make 
18. This policy argument can also be employed in urging that the commission of 
an unlawful, overt act within the forum district by one co-conspirator establishes 
proper venue in that district for all conspirators on the theory that one corporation is 
an agent for its co-conspirators, but the majority of the cases hold otherwise. See 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953): 
While a criminal action under the antitrust laws lies in any district where the 
conspiracy was formed or in part carried on or where an overt act was committed 
in furtherance thereof, Congress by 15 U.S.C. § 15 placed definite limits on venue 
in treble damage actions ••.• It must, therefore, have contemplated that such 
proceedings might be severed and transferred or filed in separate districts 
originally. 
Accord, Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1957): 
[IJn a private anti-trust suit, the mere allegation of conspiracy (does not] make an 
alleged co-conspirator, as such, a foreign corporation's "agent" for purposes of 
venue under Section 12 of the Clayton Act in any district where such co-conspirator 
is amenable to suit and the conspiracy is alleged to have had an impact. 
Contra, Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., Inc., 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1946); Haleiwa Theatre 
Co, v. Forman, 37 F.R.D. 62 (D. Hawaii 1965). However, it is noteworthy that the 
principal case was decided by a court in the one circuit which adopts the minority 
view on the co-conspirator question, Thus in the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff may not 
only sue a since-departed defendant in the district where the injury occurred, but he 
may also sue his co-conspirators regardless of their location at the time of suit. 
19. As a rule, there is no discussion of this issue in the typical short opinions 
written in these cases. In Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 
Tex. 1964), an antitrust case stemming from the activities of .Billie Sol Estes in Texas, 
the court, when discussing the venue question, employed the term "elude," which may 
indicate some judicial cognizance of a defendant's motive for leaving a state, Id. at 329. 
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venue as easily determinable as possible without adopting the nar-
row view, it is submitted that the broad view should be applied 
regardless of a corporation's subjective reasons for leaving a given 
district. 20 
A second problem in delineating the boundaries of the broad 
view adopted by the court in the principal case is whether the acts 
which give rise to the cause of action must have taken place in the 
forum district in order for venue to be proper after a corporation 
has departed. That is, _should a corporation that has left state X 
still be amenable to suit there for antitrust violations committed 
in state Y? In every case previously decided on the basis of the 
broad interpretation, the allegedly violative acts had taken place 
in the forum district and in connection with the general business 
being carried on there.21 Furthermore, to be consistent with the 
courts' interpretation of Congress' purpose (to help injured plain-
tiffs sue in their own home districts), venue should be upheld after 
the corporation leaves the district only in those situations where 
the defendant's acts occurred within that district. 
A third question that remains unanswered is how long after 
the alleged violation, or after a corporation's departure from the 
forum district, is venue still proper there. No express time limit 
was mentioned by the court in the principal case or in the cases 
it cited.22 The corporation could be held amenable to suit in the 
district for the full four-year period provided in the Clayton Act's 
20. A contrary conclusion would give a plaintiff the nearly impossible task of 
proving the broad negative that the defendant corporation sold a branch or ceased 
transacting business in a district for the purpose of discouraging antitrust suits, rather 
than for one of a plethora of justifiable business reasons. Of course, this problem of 
proof could be solved by shifting the burden to the defendant. 
21. Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Tex. 1964). The acts 
in question are described as "defendant's said ex.tensive and prolonged business activity 
there, to the alleged undoing of the plaintiff ••• .'' Id. at 329. (Emphasis added.) In 
Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1954), 
the court held: 
The result is that if the Defendant was participating in any business combination 
or conspiracy in this district in 1948 in such a manner as to violate the antitrust 
acts, it was suable here in 1953 no matter its then location. 
Id. at 402. (Emphasis added.) In R. J. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial 
Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1960), the court restricted its holding to situations 
where the "transaction of business within a district by a corporation violated the 
proscribed provisions.'' Id. at 523. (Emphasis added.) None of these cases implies, 
however, that a corporation cannot be sued where it is doing business at the time of 
suit for antitrust violations committed in other districts. The textual statement and 
supporting authority deal only with suits wherein the defendant corporation is not 
transacting business in the forum district at the time of suit. It is submitted that 
amenability to suit in these latter cases should be limited to situations where the 
violative acts were committed in the forum district. 
22. In the reported cases, the longest time span between the commission of the 
violative acts and the commencement of suit was five years. Ross-Bart Port Theatre 
Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1954). ' 
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statute of limitations.23 In the event of the tolling of this statute of 
limitations during the pendency of a government suit against the 
defendant,24 proper venue could be limited to a reasonable period 
in excess of four years if the court concludes that continued amena-
bility to suit would be an undue hardship on the defendant. An-
other possibility is that the "reasonable" time limit be imposed in 
all cases in which the "departing corporation situation" is en-
countered, notwithstanding the fact that the corporation's amena-
bility to suit might terminate before the statute of limitations has 
run.215 However, an evaluation of these possibilities indicates that 
the corporation should be subject to suit for the full period pro-
vided by the statute of limitations, even when extended by the 
tolling provision, rather than for a shorter "reasonable" time. The 
statutory period is preferable both because it provides a greater 
advantage to the treble damage plaintiff and because it is objective 
and uniform. 
However, an alternative solution to this problem of the dura-
tion of amenability to suit may be found in the corporate licensing 
procedures of the individual states. In many states, a licensed cor-
poration may be sued there on claims arising out of local business 
even after the corporation departs; either consent to suit is a con-
dition of the license itself, or a corporation may have to agree to 
waive venue objections when it files a certificate of withdrawal.26 
Thus it would seem that a state can itself determine, within the 
boundaries of the Clayton Act's statute of limitations,27 how long 
after a corporation stops transacting business in a district it will 
continue to be amenable to antitrust suits in local federal district 
courts. While a liberal venue definition admittedly favors plaintiffs, 
theoretically some protection will be afforded defendants by the 
211. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964), under the heading "Limitation of 
Action" provides: "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15 or 15a 
of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within 4 years after the cause 
of action accrued." 
24. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964): 
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States • • • 
[under] the antitrust laws ••• the running of this statute of limitations in respect 
of every private right of action arising under said laws ••• shall be suspended 
during pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, that 
whenever the running ••• is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such 
cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the period 
of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued. 
25. Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 11211 (N.D. Tex. 1964), suggests 
this limitation, although in reference to the General Venue Statute, 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 
28 U.S.C. § 139l(c) (1964). 
26. See Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 230 F.2d 5ll (3d 
Cir. 1956). In that case, the defendant had filed a certificate of withdrawal according 
to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1001 (1958), 
by which it consented to waive venue objections to suit on its outstanding obligations. 
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1004(6) (1958): "so long as any liability remains 
outstanding against the corporation in this CoilllJlonwealth." 
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forum non conveniens provision of the General Venue Statute,28 
which is applicable to Clayton Act suits,29 and which would allow 
a transfer in cases where venue, although proper, results in extreme 
inconvenience or hardship. In practice, however, the location of the 
events and witnesses are strong factors in the choice of the more 
convenient forum and will normally mitigate toward the suit being 
brought in the district where the allegedly violative acts took place 
-usually the ·plaintiff's residence. 
An alternative80 to attempting to justify adoption of the broad 
view of section 12 by means of legislative history and various prac-
tical considerations is to incorporate into that section the liberal 
notions of venue which have evolved under the General Venue 
Statute.31 As that provision is generally interpreted, if a defendant 
corporation charged with tort or contract liability has left a juris-
diction before the time of suit, the temporal reference for venue 
is the time of the wrongful acts.82 It would appear that Congress' 
aim in passing the General Venue Statute was similar to its purpose 
in enacting section 12-to facilitate suits against corporations and 
to enable plaintiffs to sue where the claim arose.33 This interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent was borne out by the recent amendment 
28. 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964): "For the convenience of parties 
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action 
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 
29. Held applicable to antitrust suits. United States v. National City Lines, 337 
U.S. 78 (1949); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949), 10 A.L.R.2d 921 (1950); Greve v. 
Gibralter Enterprises, 85 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949). 
30. The principal case does not consider this approach, since it was not argued by 
the parties to the district court. Principal case at 779 n.5. 
31. 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 139l{c) (1964): 
Venue generally. A corporation may be sued in an judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial 
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes. 
The General Venue Statute applies to all civil actions. Its relation to certain specific 
venue statutes, among them the Clayton Act, is as yet undecided, but a recent decision 
by the Supreme Court, Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 86 Sup. Ct. 1394 (1966), suggests that, 
in light of the congressional purpose to liberalize venue in antitrust actions, the statute 
soon will be held to supplement the Clayton Act. See note 15 supra and accompanying 
text. In Pure Oil, the Court overruled Leith v. Oil Transport Co., 321 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 
1963), which held that § 139l(c) did not supplement the Jones Act. It also limited 
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957), involving patent 
infringement cases, to that specific subject-matter. The Court concluded that § 139l(c) 
did supplement the venue provision of the Jones Act because Congress' purpose in 
enacting § 1391(c) was expansive. See 62 MICH. L. REv. 897 (1964). 
32. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enterprises, 353 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co.-v. Carl J. Austad&: Sons, 343 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963); Electrical Equip. Co. v. 
Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 217 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954); L'Heureux v. Central Am. 
Airways Flying Serv., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1962). Contra, Dixie Carriers, Inc. 
v. National Maritime Union of America, 35 F.R.D. 365 (S.D. Tex. 1964); I MooRE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE CJ 0.142 [5.-3] (2d' ed. 1964). 
33. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austad&: Sons, supra note 32, at 11-12: 
L'Heureux v. Central Am. Airways Flying Serv., Inc., supra note 32, at 715. 
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of the General Venue Statute, which now states explicitly that suit 
may be brought against a corporation in a district "in which the 
claim arose."34 If the amended General Venue Statute is applied 
directly to Clayton Act cases or if its interpretation is carried over 
to section 12, all corporations "found" or "transacting business" 
within a district at the time of allegedly violative acts will be sub-
ject to suit there.85 However, the problem with using the General 
Venue Statute to establish venue for antitrust cases is that it requires 
that a corporation at least be "doing business" in the district and 
more contacts with the forum district are necessary to satisfy the 
"doing business" concept than are required under the Clayton Act's 
"transacting business" test.36 Supplementing the Clayton Act by the 
General Venue Statute would thus leave in doubt the venue stan-
dards which are to be applied to those corporations which fail to 
meet the more substantial "doing business" test but which do satisfy 
the "transacting business" test at the time of the acts although not at 
the time of suit. Thus, the recognition of the General Venue Stat-
ute's time standards in connection with the Clayton Act appears 
preferable to the mechanical addition of the General Statute to the 
Clayton Act if only because the former course of action leaves fewer 
unanswered questions than does the latter. 
The principal case reinforces the broad interpretation of sec-
tion 12 of the Clayton Act by holding that venue is proper if a cor-
poration, although it had left the forum district before the suit 
was instituted, was transacting business in that district when the acts 
in question occurred there. However, a split of authority still exists 
regarding the proper temporal reference under section 12. A third 
alternative, suggested herein, would appear to avoid the extensive 
controversy which has developed over the interpretation of the 
statute. Having accepted the premise that section 12 expanded the 
choice of forums beyond those available before its enactment, 37 it 
should follow that the General Venue Statute's temporal standards 
ought to be applied to treble damage actions. Thus the same result 
could be reached as in the principal case-a result consistent with 
both congressional intent and policy. 
34. As amended in 1966, 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § l!l9l(b) (1964) now reads: 
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship 
may be brou~ht only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in 
which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law. [Emphasis added.] 
35. See generally Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Fooshee v. Interstate Vending Co., 234 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (D. Kan. 
1964); American Football League v. National Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264 (D. Md. 
1961); .Bertha .Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.N.Y. 
1952); Anderson-Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
36. "The courts have held that the terms 'transact business' refer to a lesser degree 
to commercial activity than that required to establish the usual jurisdiction concept 
of 'doing business.'" Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. Mead Corp., 189 F. Supp. 584, 586 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
37. See note 31 supra. 
